The Ninth Army Attacks
3 November28 November 1944
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THUS did the infantry regiments see their first offensive action. On 1 November 1944, after long months of training, maneuver and travel, the stage was set for the appearance of the entire 102d Infantry Division as a combat unit in the fight to destroy the might of the German Wehrmacht.
At noon on 3 November with all units on German soil, the
Division plus the 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion, operating under the XIII Corps assumed
full responsibility for a defensive sector generally southwest of Geilenkirchen, running
from Waurichen on the southeast, through Teveren, Hatterath and Birgden to Kreuzrath on
the northwest (Map4). As this area was already held by two of our
regiments, the relief amounted simply to a transfer of responsibility from the 2d Armored
Division for the sector of the 405th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) on the right, and from
the 29th Infantry Division for the sector of the 407th Infantry on the left. It was a
thinly held line of approximately 23,500 yards.
In furtherance
of a plan to give every element of the Division front-line experience under relatively
quiet conditions, the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 407th Infantry
on 5 November. It immediately relieved Company A of that regiment in the one hot spot then
existing on the Divisions left flank. It was during the defense of this sector that
five men and one officer of the troop risked their lives in broad daylight to dig out
three fellow soldiers who were buried alive in foxholes which had caved in as a result of
a heavy barrage of enemy mortar and 88mm gun fire. For their heroism these men were the
first to be awarded the Bronze Star Medal by the Division commander.
THE SIEGFRIED LINE
The Siegfried
Line, euphemistically called the Westwall, was based upon the first strong
natural barriers east of the German frontier. In the sector of the Ninth Army these
barriers were provided by the Wurm River and in the northern three miles by both the Wurm
and the Roer Rivers which converged and joined. West of the Wurm the defenses consisted
for the most part of minefields and barbed wire. The river itself which was a
comparatively narrow, shallow and very swift-flowing stream with steep, high banks,
together with the cuts and fills of a railroad which paralleled it, constituted a
serious tank and an appreciable infantry obstacle. West of the river the basis of defense
was a large number of reinforced concrete-and-steel pill-boxes, mounting machine guns and
antitank guns of light caliber.
The Siegfried Line was actually neither a line nor a wall but an elastic system of fortifications that extended approximately 450 miles from the Swiss frontier in the south to Cleve in Holland. It was begun in 1936 when the Germans reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland and originally extended only to Maastricht in Limburg, the southern province of the Netherlands. At the outset of the war the Nazis worked with feverish haste to lengthen the system northward so as to link it up with the natural barrier that would be formed by flooding parts of Holland and Belgium. By May 1940 the project was largely completed and with the fall of France no further work was done on the Siegfried Line until early in 1944.
Specifically
the Siegfried Line consisted of a system of large and small pillboxes and bunkers with
three to seven foot walls. All were protected by interlocking fields of fire and
reinforced by mine-fields, fences and lines of obstacles. In addition there were antitank
ditches, machine-gun nests and concrete or steel-rail dragons teeth. Streams and
ravines were turned into antitank obstacles by deepening and widening them to an
average depth of three and a half yards and an average width of six to eight yards.
Low-lying meadows and fields were capable of being flooded to make them impassable
(See Map 5).
This defensive
system, however, had been conceived and built before combat experiences with Russia
taught the German Army the principles of all-around defense. It therefore contained
certain weaknesses of which the limited fields of fire from pillboxes, the inability of
most of the boxes to accommodate guns heavier than 37mm, the lack of sufficient density
of defenses to prevent well planned infiltration by foot troops, and the difficulty of
intercommunication during combat were the most important.
THE PLAN OF ATTACK
As first
planned, the Ninth Army was to execute the attack, assisted on its left by elements of the
British XXX Corps which was scheduled to take over that part of the Ninth Army front lying
north and west of the boundary between the 405th and the 407th Infantry Regiments. The
XIII Corps, under command of Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., which took over responsibility
for the north flank from the XIX Corps, including the sector of the 102d Infantry
Division, at 0001 on 8 November, was initially charged with responsibility for the
operation. The 84th Infantry Division (less 335th Infantry, still attached to 30th
Infantry Division) which was just arriving from France was chosen to accomplish the
mission. In order to facilitate coordination it was later decided that the British XXX
Corps should- control the entire operation and the 84th Infantry Division was then
attached to that organization.
were to take
the lead and, followed by foot troops, were to mop up all resistance in the town itself
and seize the high ground to the north and northeast. Positions were to be consolidated
at that point with the 405th Infantry at the XIII Corps boundary on the left.
TERRAIN
The seeming
advantages for offensive movement were countered by extraordinarily extensive community
digging on the part of the enemy. Two formidable antitank ditches about ten feet wide
and eight feet deep were encountered in this sector. One began northwest of Apweiler and
extended south to a point west of Loverich with several short gaps near Floverich. A more
continuous ditch protected the western approaches to Ederen. These ditches tied in with a
system of fire trenches and foxholes and gave promise of impending difficulty. Large
mine-fields were also installed to block normal avenues of approach, and barbed-wire
concertinas of unusual dimensions were employed to close gaps in the defenses.
Here lay the
first offensive mission for the Ozarks, and all efforts of planning and preparation were
directed toward solution of the problems involved. These initially proved to be mostly
logistical in nature since there were but two crossings over the Wurm on this portion of
the front and the road-net east of that river was very limited. Unfavorable weather
conditions had rendered cross-country movement for wheeled vehicles out of the question.
Furthermore, it was foreseen that with the 2d Armored Division attacking east and the 84th
Infantry Division attacking north, traffic conditions in the area, and particularly at
the Wurm River bridges, would be very congested.
A further
logistical complication lay in the fact that the Corps plan provided that the 113th
Cavalry Group, heavily reinforced, would precede the division to the Gereonsweiler area
from where it would launch an attack north to seize Lindern and the high ground running
west from that town. The further mission of this unit, which was designated Task
Force Biddle (named after Col. William S. Biddle, its commander), was to protect the
north flank of the Corps and to push reconnaissance to the Roer. This force was to be
attached to the 102d Infantry Division and its reinforcements were to include the 1st
Battalion 405th Infantry as well as the 40th Tank Battalion and all of the artillery of
the 7th Armored Division.
ATTACKIMMENDORF FALLS
Immendorf,
Floverich and Loverich were struck by one squadron each of fighter-bombers prior to the
attack. Damage in the towns was great although cratering fortunately was not extensive and
damage to buildings and roads did not hinder passage of the assault waves and normal
military traffic. Gereonsweiler and Ederen were also targets for bombings in the
preliminary air show. Prisoners of war later stated that the only result achieved was the
dispersion of troops into foxholes during the bombardment.
Task Force X,
from its assembly area in the vicinity of Waurichen, struck at 1245. Company E, 406th
Infantry, attacking on the right flank of the battalions 300-yard front with tanks
leading, attempted to envelop Immendorf from the southeast. Company F struck from the
left flank, also with close tank support. Moving swiftly, the troops encountered little
resistance during the approach to the town. German snipers inside Immendorf fought
stubbornly, and it became necessary to carry out a house-to-house mop-up. By 1430 the
mission was accomplished and organization of a perimeter defense on the north and east
sides of the town began. Casualties were light, although four tanks were disabled in
passing through a minefield. (See Map 6).
Actually, the
enemy had taken advantage of the previous days failure to seize Apweiler to heavily
reinforce it against future assaults. Terrain features operated against a force advancing
northeast to secure the high ground that had been the 2d Armored objective in the two
previous futile attacks. A ridge, with its slopes running to the northwest and southeast,
was in the center of the task force sector, the top paralleling the axis of advance. A
wooded draw to the north offered some defilade but southern slopes were more gentle and
dropped off into level fields north of Puffendorf. German antitank guns and Mark V tanks
were cleverly dug in approximately 1,500 yards to the east, on the high ground just west
of Gereonsweiler. From there they were able to observe all movement to the southwest and
south, and, by virtue of heavier guns, outranged our Sherman tanks and rendered them
completely ineffective.
THIRD DAYAPWEILER TAKEN
The importance
of holding Immendorf to protect the left flank of the 2d Armored Division drive was now
fully realized. Interrogation of prisoners taken the previous day revealed plans for
another enemy attack at 0600 hours on 18 November. Accordingly, planned artillery fire
was brought down in front of the entire sector at 0530 hours. The attack did not
materialize at the scheduled time but a weak effort was finally made at 0700 hours which
was promptly thrown back by defensive fires. Prisoners said that artillery caused such
heavy losses that all plans were completely disrupted. Eight Panther tanks supported the
attack but withdrew after three were disabled.
attack from
the west. The 3d Battalion, 406th Infantry, was ordered to mount the attack and withdrew
from its positions around Immendorf at 1145 hours. The 1st Battalion was assigned to
support the attack with fire. The day was excellent for the XXIX TAC fighter-bombers
which turned out in force and flew 407 sorties. In addition to strafing the enemy front
lines, they dropped 117 tons of bombs and 5,850 gallons of the highly incendiary Napalm on
other enemy troops and installations.
While the 84th
struggled with the Germans on the Wurm, preparations for capturing Gereonsweiler on 20
November were well under way. Combat Command B of the 2d Armored Division was ordered to
attack not later than 0900. Task Force X in turn received orders to attack abreast with
the mission of taking the north section of the town. Elements of the 10th and 11th
Panzergrenadier Regiments of the 9th Panzer Division, the 115th Panzer Reconnaissance
Battalion of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division, and remnants of the 183d Infantry
Division, held the city.
In the center Task Force 2 initially pressed forward against
scattered smallarms fire. As the troops began crossing
the high ground to their front heavy machine-gun fire from the area south of
Gereonsweiler pinned them down for a half hour. Tank fire into
the objective aided the advance, however, in spite of the enemys heavy armor firing
from the vicinity of Beeck, leading elements of TF2 reached Gereonsweiler ahead of TFX.
These forces crossed the southeast corner of the town, pushed to the high ground east of
Gereonsweiler (and north of TF I) and began to consolidate their positions at 1430 hours.
Company C,
771st Tank Destroyer Battalion, promptly moved to the east of Apweiler and engaged the
enemy guns. This maneuver was successful in drawing all the fire to the tank destroyers;
it was costly, however, for the company lost all but three of its fighting vehicles. Once
the harassing fire had been diverted the troops rapidly entered Gereonsweiler. Many
enemy infantrymen fled. Some took refuge in cellars. Those who remained on their positions
had their observation hampered by smoke from an oil reservoir, which had been set afire on
the right flank, and from fires set by the flame throwers which were employed on the
outskirts but did not enter the town.
Companies B and
C drove straight through the town, attained the northeastern outskirts at 1300 hours and
organized for defense. Company A made contact with the tanks of Company H to the north and
swung back to Gereonsweiler to complete mopping-up operations.
This well
organized and vigorously extended attack completely demoralized the defenders, and
German troops began streaming in a withdrawal toward Linnich. They were cut down in large
numbers by Companies B and C. The town was thus secured by 1400 hours but it was not
until 1700 that all the enemy within the village were captured.
The enemy
situation at this time was summarized in a field order of Combat Command B, directing the
next days operation:
SWIFT ATTACK
Promptly at
H-hour, the 3d Battalion, 406th Infantry, with Company K attacking on the right and
Company L on the left, moved out. The battalion followed so closely behind our artillery
fire that it reached its objective twenty-two minutes later. Resistance, however, was
light since the enemy had suffered heavily the day before.
This
attack forced Company A to withdraw to the south about three hundred yards to a better
position where it obtained defilade against machinegun and small-arms fire. Here the
company made a determined stand, restored the line, and drove the enemy back. Because of
the heavy fighting in this area it became necessary to employ Company B, 327th Engineer
Combat Battalion: The engineers acquitted themselves well as infantrymen. The 2d
Battalion, which had moved to Gereonsweiler earlier in the day as a reserve, reassembled
during the counterattack in order to furnish depth to the defense.
Poor soil
trafficability throughout the operation had canalized movement of armored vehicles to
roads and high ground. The enemy, however, fully exploited the heavy frontal armor of his
Mark VI tanks. On several occasions he had maneuvered the Tigers into position between
3,000 and 3,500 yards from our tank destroyers and tanks and engaged in a fire fight. At
this range even the 90mm projectile of the M36 TDs ricocheted off the front of the Mark
VI German tanks while the enemys high velocity guns still neutralized Shermans and
TDs.
REPULSE AT BEECK
The 84th
Divisions gains north of Geilenkirchen had been made at the expense of committing
the entire division with the exception of the 335th Infantry, which under 2d Armored
control, moved into the Floverich area to effect a relief of troops in line. As a result
of its rapid advances, the 84ths flanks were now exposed. It was therefore
necessary to eliminate this threat from the east by seizing the town of Beeck and the
neighboring commanding ground. To accomplish this mission Maj. Gen. Alexander R.
BoIling, commander of the Railsplitters, planned to use the 405th Infantry which had
been under his control since 17 November.
FROM: Lieut-General
B. G. Horrocks, GB, DSO, MC
DO/9
Main Hq 30 Corps
26 Nov 44
My dear
Keating,
I am writing to
thank you for the co-operation which you have shown to my Corps since we have been in this
area. All my units report that they received the maximum amount of help from your
battalions when the 43d Division was taking over the front from 407 RCT.
When additional
troops were required in order to maintain the momentum of the attack around
Geilenkirchen, 405 RCT was placed under my command.
I cannot speak
too highly of the way these troops operated in the offensive operation NE of Prummern.
Although the regiment was unable to capture the village of Beeck, the attack was pressed
forward in the face of considerable fire from the elements of three German divisions.
Throughout these operations 405 RCT was most ably handled by Colonel Williams.
We shall watch
for the continued success of your division with sympathetic interest.
Yours sincerely
/s/ B. G.
HRROCKS
Brigadier
General Frank A. Keating, Commanding General
102 US
Infantry Division.
DISPLACEMENT AND REORGANIZATION
By now the
problem of moving the Division to the east for further combat had become relatively
simple. With two regimental combat teams already across the Wurm River, there remained but
one main task that of
transporting the 407th from its reserve position near Brunssum to a forward assembly
area in the towns of Puffendorf, Floverich, Loverich, and Beggendorf. This operation was
accomplished on 24 November and on the same day the Division headquarters moved to the
vicinity of Ubach.
To the front,
the 406th Infantry was holding a defensive line running generally from Ederen
northwest to the LinnichLindern road. On the left of this sector, the 335th
Infantry of the 84th Division held a defensive position extending northwest to the high
ground one mile south of Lindern. In this position the 335th Infantry was in contact on
its left with the 405th Infantry, still in the 84th Infantry Division sector.
XIII
Corps now began to regroup its forces in order to return all units to parent control.
Commencing on the night of 26-27 November, the 405th Infantry was relieved by the 334th
Infantry Regiment of the 84th Infantry Division. On the following night the 405th
Infantry, once more under Division control, relieved the 335th Infantry. By 28
November all moves had been completed and the Division was reassembled and in position
to strike to the east.
A more
conspicuous memorial to these terrific battles, however, was the debris which littered the
stinking beet and cabbage fields throughout the winter months. At the
GereonsweilerPuffendorf crossroad, still under interdictory fire, one could count
forty-three knocked-out armored vehicles of all types. Eight of these were Tiger Royals,
burned out and blackened, a bitter remembrance of the struggle to reach the Roer River.
IMMENDORF and the high ground to the north was secured 16-23 November after seven days of hard fighting in which the following men earned- the Silver Star Medal.
T/Sgt. JAMES B. AUSTIN, Company L, 406th Infantry instrumental in breaking up a counterattack . . . captured two prisoners with valuable information and succeeded in evacuating them despite enemy fire.
S/Sgt. JOHN A. BARTTUCCI, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion skillful handling of his platoon in the attack ..against heavy enemy armor and numerically superior forces.
2d Lt. HANES F. CAIN, Co. F, 406th Infantry ... after leading a successful assault he was killed while supervising the disposition of his troops to insure their personal safety.
Capt. JOHN E. CZAJKOWSKI, Co. E, 406th Infantry inspiring leadership under intense artillery fire . . . directed the establishment of defense after a successful attack
Lt. Col. CECIL R. EVERETT, First Battalion, 406th Infantry superior leadership . . . and great personal bravery in battle.
2d Lt. EGON E. FRIEDMAN, 771st Tank Battalion . . . despite a direct hit on his tank .. . he succeeded in maneuvering to locate and destroy an antitank gun.
Pfc. ALBERT F. HURLEY, JR., Company H, 406th Infantry crawled 300 yards across open ground to knock out a tank with an antitank rocket, thus blocking an approach and forcing two other hostile tanks to withdraw . . . counterattack repulsed.
S/Sgt. NORBERT E. KARL, 771st Tank Battalion . .. evacuated a wounded crew from a tank under an artillery barrage.
Capt. KENNETH K. KEOWN, Second Battalion Medical Detachment, 406th Infantry . . . surgeon . . . working under continuous artillery and mortar fire . . . evacuated casualties wounded in a minefield.
S/Sgt. FRANK LECCI, Company H, 406th Infantry his unit hard pressed by the enemy . . . his coolness and bravery inspired his comrades to rally.
Capt. JOSEPH A. MANN, Company F, 406th Infantry successfully led his company in the capture of a small town set up defenses . . . which he inspected despite heavy fire . . . killed by a near miss . . . inspired company repulsed a counterattack.
TjSgt. JAMES F. MALONE, Company F, 406th Infantry exceptional bravery in repulsing a counterattack reorganized troops after an enemy penetration . . . eliminated the pocket thus formed.
Sgt. ANTHONY A. MASLULLO, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . rescued a crew member from a flaming vehicle . . . later destroyed two PZKWVs . . . was mortally wounded when his own vehicle received a direct hit.
S/Sgt. MATT MIERZWA, Company M, 406th Infantry assumed command of his platoon after his leaders had been wounded in a counterattack . . . reorganized his force and accomplished a successful withdrawal . . . returned to evacuate wounded comrades.
Lt. Col. VERLE D. MILLER, Third Battalion, 406th Infantry . . . gallant and skillful leadership of his battalion in the attack.
Lt. Col. JAMES H. REEVES, JR., Second Battalion, 406th Infantry . . . courageous and skillful leadership of his battalion in the attack.
T/5 THOMAS I. PUGH, Battery A, 380th Field Artillery Battalion.., servicing a broken communications line under fire he rescued a wounded officer, and was himself wounded in accomplishing . . . hazardous mission.
1st Lt. WILLARD W. WHITE, Third Battalion, 405th Infantry . . . assistant surgeon . . . who inspired his men . in evacuating wounded in mid-battle.
APWEILER fell on 19 November 1944 after a furious three-day battle during which the following men, because of their heroic and gallant actions, earned the Silver Star Medal.
1st Lt. ALBERT F. ABATE, Company K, 406th Infantry boldly charged and annihilated a machine-gun emplacement holding up the assault.
Sgt. CONRAD P. AUER, Company C, 77 1st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . suffered severe burns when his tank destroyer was hit and set afire . . . extricated his wounded comrades amid exploding ammunition . . . carried one man to safety.
Capt. WALTER S. BRAVER, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . brilliantly maneuvered his tank destroyers under intense direct fire . . . successfully repelled enemy tanks . . . thereby saving lives of hard pressed infantry.
1st Lt. CHARLES A. BROWN, Company L, 406th Infantry a platoon leader under fire . . captured a half track and eliminated several snipers impeding his units advance.
Sgt. CURTIS D. BROWNING, Company L, 405th Infantry when his platoon had been pinned down in the battle for the high ground north of Apweiler... he courageously rallied the men . . . by ignoring enemy fire.. . and leading the assault.
Pvt. THOMAS J. CLANCY, JR., Medical Section, Second Battalion, 406th Infantry . . . deliberately entered a minefield being detonated by heavy enemy fire in order to succor and evacuate his wounded comrades.
Pvt. CLELL CRANE, Company B, 406th Infantry . . . under heavy fire rendered first aid to his platoon leader with whom he stayed for three hours before he could safely evacuate the wounded man . . . then returned to his squad.
Pfc. JOHN M. DEGROVE, Company K, 406th Infantry
although wounded he eliminated an enemy machine-gun section which endangered his company, killing and wounding 12 enemy and . . . capturing 35 others.
Pvt. JOHN F. FLYNN, JR., Company C, 406th Infantry successfully laid a communications wire at night under
heavy artillery and mortar fire . . . gravely wounded
mission accomplished.
S/Sgt. FRED GUILLOZ, JR., Company L, 406th Infantry advanced under intense fire . . . successfully neutralized two enemy gun emplacements camouflaged as hay stacks.. capturing 25 prisoners.
Pfc. KENNETH B. HARRIS, Company B, 406th Infantry although wounded, he remained as an aid man, to treat his comrades.
Sgt. DOMINIC G. KALLAS, Company I, 406th Infantry .. ignoring enemy fire he left his position to deliver effective antitank rocket fire against attacking armor.
Capt. WILLIAM C. HUNGATE, Company B, 406th Infantry led the attack with complete disregard for enemy fire assisting his men with grenades and fire.
Pvt. THOMAS W. ILES, Company B, 406th Infantry during a counterattack he killed two machine gunners although his rifle had jammed . . . thus assisting in repelling a numerically superior enemy.
Pvt. FRANCIS F. KELLEY, Medical Section, 1st Battalion, 406th Infantry . . . led his team beyond the front lines during the battle to evacuate wounded . . . until exhausted.
T/Sgt. EDWARD B. KLACZA, Company L, 406th Infantry fought forward against intense fire . . . successfully neutralized two enemy machine-gun emplacements camouflaged as hay stacks . . . captured 25 prisoners.
2d Lt. JOSEPH 0. LANE, Company K, 406th Infantry Inspiring leadership under intense fire . . . led his unit to the objective . . . killed 12 enemy.
1st Lt. ROBERT C. LEMLEY, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . skillfully led his unit against superior forces . . . destroyed five counterattacking enemy tanks enemy repulsed.
Pfc. HARRY LUKASEWSKI, Company K, 406th Infantry. wounded during a counterattack he refused to leave his position . .. and delivered effective fire until the enemy was repulsed.
2d Lt. PATRICK W. LYNCH, Company K, 406th Infantry personally led his men in the assault . . . eliminated a
machine gun holding up the attack.
T/5 EDWARD I. MALONEY, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . evacuated wounded comrades to safety...Assumed command of vehicle in the battle.
Pfc. EDWIN E. MILLER, Company K, 406th Infantry although wounded he assumed command of his squad . courageous example inspired his men in the fire fight, accounting for twenty enemy dead.
Pfc. OLIVER A. OBERG, Company L, 406th Infantry . crawled over open ground . . . under enemy fire . . . to knock out an enemy tank with a rocket launcher.
S/Sgt. CARL S. PAUL, Company A, 406th Infantry mortally wounded after crossing two hundred yards of fireswept terrain to successfully eliminate enemy snipers.
Pfc. ROBERT B. PHILLIPS, Company L, 406th Infantry ... fatally wounded in intense enemy fire, he successfully assaulted two enemy machine-gun nests threatening the advance of his platoon.
Pfc. JOSEPH D. H. WATCHORN, Company C, 406th Infantry . . . successfully laid a communication wire at night under heavy artillery and mortar fire.., seriously wounded mission completed.
2d Lt. ROBERT J. WILSON, Headquarters Third Battalion, 406th Infantry . . . rescued a wounded comrade despite a heavy artillery barrage.
PUFFENDORF was a hotspot after its capture by the 2d Armored Division. Five men earned the Silver Star Medal in this action.
Pvt. FRED STERN, T/5 JAY W. COETRIGHT, Company B, 327th Engineer Combat Battalion . . . constructed emplacements for twelve tank destroyers . . . within 150 yards of enemy lines . . . silhouetted by burning haystacks . . . under heavy artillery fire . . . guided TDs into positions where they were able to repulse an armored counterattack.
Sgt. CHARLES W. SHORT, Company C, 407th Infantry assumed command of a patrol when commanders were wounded in a mine field . . . succeeded in extricating entire patrol from . . . precarious position.
Pfc. HAROLD H. STEGEMAN, Company A, 407th Infantry wounded while attempting to rescue his squad leader hit by artillery fire . . . administered first aid and remained with his comrade.
Capt. KEITH G. CHATFIELD, Company C, 407th Infantry with undaunted spirit... he led his company against fierce enemy fire . . . killed while helping rescue one of his men who had been wounded.
GEREONSWEILER was defended for three days, 17-20 November, before it capitulated after which our troops were severely counterattacked and were able to retain their positions only by skillful and courageous defense.
S/Sgt. WILLIAM R. WILSON, Company B, 406th Infantry, earned the Distinguished Service Cross in this action when, on 20 November, he led three companions through a hail of fire in a series of bold assaults that netted twenty-one prisoners and two armored half track personnel carriers. He then spearheaded an attack through the town, shattering resistance and capturing twenty-nine more enemy.
The following men earned the Silver Star Medal in battles in and near Gereonsweiler:
Capt. GEORGE C. ARMENTROUT, Company C, 406th Infantry . .. during a severe counterattack he rallied his men repulsed the enemy.
Sgt. VERN E. BARNES, Company D, 405th Infantry although wounded he covered the reorganization and preparation of defenses after a successful attack.
1st Lt. GEORGE F. BEELE, Sgt. RAYMOND J. HALFMAN, Company B, 407th Infantry . . . rescued much needed equipment and ammunition . . . drove a burning ammunition truck to a safe area, thereby saving many lives.
Cpl. STANLEY BERNSTEIN, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . supported the infantry against superior enemy armor until killed by a third direct hit on his tank destroyer.
1st Sgt. WILLIAM E. BLOOM, Company B, 406th Infantry carried a wounded comrade through 200 yards of fire swept terrain to safety.
S/Sgt. CHRISTOPHER W. CROSSETT, Company L, 406th Infantry . . . succeeded in carrying a message to a unit isolated by a counterattack, thereby insuring its safe withdrawal.
S/Sgt. JOSEPH C. DEC, Company M, 406th Infantry .assumed command of his platoon . . . leader killed . . . inspired his men to repulse a counterattack.
Capt. ROBERT B. DEXTER, Company A, 406th Infantry reorganized his company after a severe counterattack and successfully held a precarious defensive position, thus insuring that hard won gains were consolidated.
S/Sgt. NICHOLAS J. DI CANIO, Company F, 405th Infantry . . although under continuous small arms fire he attacked and blew open with a pole charge a concrete emplacement . . . captured seventeen enemy.
Sgt. JOSEPH CAPOZZI, JR., Company D, 406th Infantry rescued a wounded driver from a flaming vehicle ... under an artillery barrage.
1st Lt. ROBERT E. DICKINSON, Cannon Company, 406th Infantry . . . as forward observer he accompanied the infantry into battle, thus insuring effective support . . . gallant action beyond call of duty.
1st Lt. ALBERT H. DUCKWITZ, Company A, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . directed artillery fire . . . from exposed position . . . forcing enemy withdrawal.
S/Sgt. GEORGE M. DUNN, Company C, 406th Infantry with Private Vavra . . . immobilized two armored vehicles by placing grenades in the track mechanism . . . killed four enemy . . . secured four prisoners . . . thus enabling his platoon to advance. *
Capt. WILLIAM H. ELLIOTT, Company-B, 327th Engineer Combat Battalion . . . inspired leadership . . . under critical battle conditions . . . insured safety of his command.
Lt. Col. LE Roy E. FRAZIER, First Battalion, 405th Infantry... led his command forward in the face of heavy enemy fire . . . to successfully gain his objective . . . inspired leadership.
S/Sgt. JOHN R. GARBUTT, JR., Company B, 406th Infantry alone he disabled an armored vehicle, capturing and evacuating three prisoners with vital information.
Pfc. PASCUAL JUAREZ, S/Sgt. JOSE T. MONTOTA, S/Sgt. JOSEPH M. SMITH, Company B, 406th Infantry ... isolated, they fought on against a superior force ... capturing twenty-one prisoners .. . then rejoined their company to spearhead an attack . . . captured 27 more enemy.
1st Lt. CHARLES E. KINNEY, Company D, 406th Infantry inspiring leadership . . . and exceptional bravery in
battle . . . skillful attack . . . minimum losses.
1st Lt. ST. CLAIR A. KNIGHT, Company 1, 406th Infantry eliminated, in the face of furious fire, a machine gun which was holding up the attack.
Pfc. ABE M. KUZMINSKY, Company C, 406th Infantry although alone on an exposed flank . . . he wiped out an attacking squad . . . with a BAR . . . during a furious counterattack.
Pfc. JOSEPH J. MCCARTHY, Company B, 406th Infantry ... knowing that his secure position would be jeopardized by the disclosure, he nevertheless gave warning of the presence of penetrating enemy . . . thereby enabling a successful counteraction to be mounted.
Sgt. JOHN F. ODoNOVAN, Company B, 406th Infantry... instrumental in capturing two enemy armored vehicles.
2d Lt. ERVO A. TARSI, Battery C, 380th Field Artillery Battalion ... directed artillery fire for two days and a night from positions at times behind the enemy lines . . . assisted in repulsing several vicious counterattacks.
Pvt. JOSEPH R. VAVRA, Company C, 406th Infantry with Sergeant Dunn... immobilized two armored vehicles by placing grenades in the track mechanism . . . killed four enemy . . . secured four prisoners . . . thus enabling his platoon to advance.
Sgt. Lotus KLEIN, Pvt. WAYNE J. WALDEN, Company C, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion - . . boldly supported infantry against superior enemy armor . . . although receiving three direct hits they continued until Private WALDEN was wounded.
Sgt. NORTON R. SMITH, Company L, 406th Infantry immobilized a tank by crawling over fire swept terrain to drop a hand grenade down the open hatch.
1st Lt. BOYD M. WITHEROW, Company L, 406th Infantry crawled forward toward a machine gun to divert fire toward himself so that his men could safely follow successfully eliminated the hostile gun with a grenade.
S/Sgt. JOHN L. SCHLER, Company F, 406th Infantry his squad isolated by an armored penetration during a counterattack he rallied his surviving comrades and succeeded in defending the position . . . killed by a direct artillery hit.
BEECK and the high ground of Apweiler was a furious battleground from 21 to 23 November. The fighting raged back and forth with some of the most furious tank battles of the war occurring here when armored counterattacks were repulsed.
Sgt. JOSEPH J. WILD, Company E, 405th Infantry, although painfully wounded in one attack crawled through small arms fire to a haystack which concealed snipers. Setting the hay on fire with incendiary grenades, he forced the enemy into the open, killing two and capturing a third Then he diverted enemy fire to himself by throwing hand grenades, thus enabling his platoon to establish a secure defense. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross his bravery.
The following men won the Silver Star
Medal in the battle for BEECK:
Capt. JAMES W. CORNER, S/Sgt. LEROY D. HAINES, Pfc. ARHUR H. LABAIRE, 1st Lt. ROBERT M. LEACH, Company A, 405th Infantry . . . reconnoitering a route of advance for their company . . . they surprised a troop shelter, capturing nineteen prisoners . . . later led the company in a furious and successful attack.
Pfc. HARRY BEAN, T/Sgt. PAUL J. PADGETT, Sgt. HAROLD T. SAGE, Headquarters Company, 405th Infantry . . . insured the success of an attack . . . by successfully patrolling in the face of an ambush . . . through a minefield . . . and returned with vital information.
2d Lt. HAROLD R. ANDERSON, Battery A, 379th Field Artillery Battalion . . . led his forward observer section over a thousand yards of open terrain . . . supported an assault company from exposed positions until mortally wounded.
Pfc. RAYMOND J. BELANGER, Medical Detachment, 405th Infantry . . . in battle he moved fearlessly over no-man s land administering first aid to his comrades . . . although constantly under sniper fire . . . fatally wounded by machine-gun fire.
S/Sgt. EDMOND A. BISSAILLON, 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion . . . after his tank destroyer received a direct hit he continued to fire, knocking out one tank, and then successfully evacuated his entire crew under fire.
Pvt. JOHN A. BOORAS, Company B, 405th Infantry assumed command of twelve men isolated in battle . . . led them through intense fire . . . neutralized a machine gun with grenades . . . rejoined his unit.
1st Lt. MERRIT G. BRAUM, Company E, 405th Infantry boldly led his men in a furious assault against a fortified building . . . under heavy fire . . .permitting the company to advance.
Pfc. VESTER J. CHILDERS, Medical Detachment, 405th Infantry . . . constantly exposed himself to enemy fire
moving back and forth over open terrain . . . to treat casualties.
S/Sgt. JOHN C. BISCHOFF, Company F, 405th Infantry although wounded he remained at his post .. . and fired until his ammunition was exhausted.
Pfc. EMMANUEL J. GIL, Company D, 450th Infantry volunteered to make contact with adjacent units ... crawled over shell-swept terrain . . . eliminated several snipers . . -accomplished his mission.
S/Sgt. CLIFTON GROVES, Company B, 405th Infantry single handedly charged a strong enemy position . eliminated resistance with grenades.
T/Sgt. WARREN M. DAVIS, Company C, 405th Infantry
singlehandedly assaulted and neutralized a position that
had pinned down his company with murderous fire . . . enabling his unit to advance.
T/Sgt. HOWARD F. DELWO, Company G, 405th Infantry assumed command of two platoons whose leaders were casualties . . . later fatally wounded.
1st Lt. CLYDE ELLIOT, 548th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion . . . with utter disregard for enemy fire . . . he led aid men through minefields to the rescue of wounded soldiers.
2d Lt. BENTON HUGHES, Company d, 405th Infantry ... although wounded he remained with his company to lead a furious attack against the town.
1st Lt. COOLY S. JASPER, Battery B, 379th Field Artillery Battalion . . . led his forward observer section through intense fire to the assistance of an assault company . . . successfully placing smoke to cover their withdrawal.
Capt. BOLES S. KNAPIK, Company E, 405th Infantry . disregarding enemy fire he led his company over open terrain . . . to drive the enemy back in retreat . . . fatally wounded.
Pvt. JOSEPH A. LEONI, Company C, 405th Infantry enabled his company to press an attack . . . by single handedly assaulting and eliminating a machine gun impeding their advance.
Capt. HAROLD J. LOEANO, Company C, 405th Infantry although wounded he continued to direct the preparation of defenses . . . assuring that his men were protected.
T/5 LAWRENCE E. MOSER, Medical Detachment, 405th Infantry . . . moved fearlessly over shell-swept terrain to treat the wounded . . . refusing to seek shelter until all had been cared for.
Capt. WILLIAM A. MILLER, Company D, 405th Infantry assumed command of the battalion . . . and successfully accomplished a withdrawal under heavy pressure.
Sgt. FRANCIS J. MURPHY, Company G, 406th Infantry observing a counterattack developing, he advanced alone to place his machine gun in position . . . where he was able to disperse the enemy forces . . . mortally wounded in this action.
Pfc. THURMAN E. NAMOMANTUBE, Company H, 405th Infantry . . . ran fifty yards over open terrain under fire to take over a machine gun.
Capt. ROBERT T. NEALON, 771st Tank Battalion . .. disregarding heavy artillery fire he reconnoitered in advance of friendly lines . . . to find lanes of advance for his tanks.
Sgt. ZYGI NOWICKI, 548th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion . . . led rescue parties through dense minefields under an enemy artillery barrage . . . to rescue a wounded soldier.
Capt. WILLIAM C. PETERSON, Company F, 405th Infantry . . crawled forward to locate two tanks holding up his company then returned for armored support which he mounted and guided into position . . . thus destroying the enemy armor . . . and enabling his company to advance.
Pfc. FOSTER L. PORTER, Company B, 405th Infantry his company halted by grazing fire .... he courageously exposed himself in order to determine the enemys position
then directed fire . . . enabling his unit to advance.
Pfc. BILLIE PRESLEY, Company B, 405th Infantry with only one round of ammunition left he rushed a machine-gun position . . - seized the enemys weapons neutralized the position.
T/Sgt. STEVE T. PUSKAR, Company B, 405th Infantry ...crawled alone against a strong enemy position which he successfully eliminated.
1st Lt. JAMES D. RAPP, Medical Detachment, 405th Infantry . . . established a forward collecting station . . . and working under hazardous conditions . . . insured that all wounded were evacuated.
1st Lt. IRVIN D. SMITH, Battery C, 379th Field Artillery Battalion . . . led his forward observer section over open terrain against intense fire to support an assault company successfully adjusted fire which dispersed strong counterattacking forces.
1st Lt. JAMES M. SHARKEY, 771st Tank Battalion . . . accomplished a foot reconnaissance of terrain under enemy fire and successfully led his tanks in the attack.
1st Lt. ROBERT S. SMITH, Company B, 405th Infantry located and single handedly silenced a machine gun
holding up the attack . . . then led a furious assault which led to the ultimate capture of the objective.
1st Lt. JACK L. WEIGAND, Company F, 405th Infantry exposed himself to intense fire in order to guide armor
to the support of his unit.
Col. LAURIN L. WILLIAMS, 405th Infantry . . . for outstanding leadership and gallantry during the attack by his regiment.
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